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Treasury Should Exclude Income
From Discharge of Student Loans
by John R. Brooks
In June the Education Department proposed
regulations that would streamline the process for
student loan discharge for situations in which an
institution deceived or defrauded its students.1 This
follows other recent student loan discharge actions,
including discharging the loans of students who
attended Corinthian College schools2 and publiciz-
ing the availability of loan discharge for disabled
former students.3 Also, late last year the new Re-
vised Pay As You Earn (REPAYE) student loan
repayment program became available, expanding
the number of borrowers who can limit their loan
payments to 10 percent of discretionary income4
and be eligible for loan forgiveness.5
The relatively fevered pace of activity around
student loans brings to the fore, yet again, the tax
issues related to student loan forgiveness. In many
cases student loan forgiveness creates what Greg
Crespi has called a ‘‘tax bomb’’ — taxable income
from the cancellation of student debt (COSD).6
While the logic for taxing typical cancellation of
debt (COD) income is sound, the policy and moral
implications of taxing COSD income are more du-
bious. Consider a debtor who has $50,000 of student
loan debt forgiven — if that COSD income fell in the
25 percent bracket, he would still owe the govern-
ment a quarter of the debt, $12,500. On one hand,
the government-as-lender says that a borrower
should not have to repay the loan; on the other
hand, the government-as-tax-collector says, pay me
a portion of that loan anyway. Creating taxable
income in that situation undermines the policy
behind loan forgiveness, while likely not raising
much revenue.
Congress and Treasury have created an odd
patchwork of tax treatment of COSD income —
exclusion in some situations and not others —
sometimes by statute and sometimes not. It is past
time to clean it up and provide a clear rule that the
cancellation of student loan debt through these
various government programs does not create tax-
able income. On July 15 Senate Finance Committee
member Robert Menendez, D-N.J., and Sen. Eliza-
beth Warren, D-Mass., introduced the Student Loan
Tax Relief Act, which would do precisely that by
amending section 108 to exclude all COSD income.71Student Assistance General Provisions, Federal Perkins
Loan Program, Federal Family Education Loan Program, Wil-
liam D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, and Teacher Educa-
tion Assistance for College and Higher Education Grant
Program (notice of proposed rulemaking), 81 F.R. 39329 (pro-
posed June 16, 2016) (to be codified at 34 CFR parts 30, 668, 674,
682, 685, and 686), available at http://federalregister.gov/a/2
016-14052.
2Department of Education, ‘‘Fact Sheet: Protecting Students
From Abusive Career Colleges’’ (June 8, 2015), available at
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/fact-sheet-protecting-
students-abusive-career-colleges.
3Department of Education, ‘‘Department of Education Acts
to Protect Social Security Benefits for Borrowers With Disabili-
ties’’ (Apr. 12, 2016), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/
press-releases/us-department-education-acts-protect-social-sec
urity-benefits-borrowers-disabilities; and ‘‘Total and Permanent
Disability (TPD) Discharge,’’ available at http://www.dis
abilitydischarge.com.
4Discretionary income is adjusted gross income less 150
percent of the relevant poverty line. 34 CFR sections
685.209(a)(2)(i) (PAYE), 685.209(c)(2)(i) (REPAYE), and
685.221(b)(1) (IBR).
5See ‘‘Revised Pay As You Earn Plan,’’ 34 CFR section
685.209(c); ‘‘Income-Driven Plans,’’ available at http://www.st
udentaid.gov/idr.
6Gregory S. Crespi, ‘‘Should We Defuse the ‘Tax Bomb’
Facing Lawyers Who Are Enrolled in Income-Based Student
Loan Repayment Plans?’’ SMU Dedman School of Law Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 225 (May 8, 2016), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2615561.
7S. ___, 114th Cong. (2016). A similar bill was introduced by
Rep. Jim McDermott, D-Wash., in the House last year. See
Student Loan Tax Debt Relief Act, H.R. 2429, 114th Cong. (2015).
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Congress should pass that bill. However, Congress
might be unable to act quickly enough for borrow-
ers already seeking discharge, especially disabled
borrowers responding to the Education Depart-
ment’s current outreach efforts. I argue here that
Treasury likely has the authority to act administra-
tively and that it should do so, especially if congres-
sional dysfunction continues.
A. Background
The federal government is the dominant student
loan lender, directly lending 90 percent of all stu-
dent loans by value.8 Before 2010 many student
loans were technically made by private lenders
through the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL)
program, but with a federal guarantee that meant
that the government bore most of the credit risk.9
But in 2010 Congress repealed the FFEL program,10
and now the Education Department makes the vast
majority of student loans through the Direct Loan
and PLUS Loan programs, among others.
Any of these loans can be discharged in some
circumstances. The Higher Education Act (HEA)
provides for loan discharge in cases of death and
disability, school closure, and false certification of
loan eligibility.11 It also provides for ‘‘defense to
repayment’’ discharge in cases of school violations
of state law, such as fraud.12
Moreover, any of those loans, including pre-2010
FFEL loans, qualify for one or more forms of
income-driven repayment and possible loan for-
giveness. Under these programs, a borrower can
pay no more than (typically) 10 percent of her
‘‘discretionary income,’’13 and any remaining bal-
ances are forgiven after 10, 20, or 25 years of regular
payments, depending on the program and other
details.14
These various programs include Public Service
Loan Forgiveness (PSLF), Income-Based Repay-
ment (IBR), Pay As You Earn (PAYE), and REPAYE.
There are some important differences between IBR,
PAYE, and REPAYE, some of which I covered in an
earlier Tax Notes article,15 but for our purposes here,
the key divide is between PSLF on one hand and
IBR, PAYE, and REPAYE on the other. (I will refer to
these collectively as IBR for simplicity.)
Under PSLF, if a borrower works for the govern-
ment or a public service organization, he can pay 10
percent of discretionary income and any remaining
debt is forgiven after 10 years.16 For the IBR pro-
grams, the borrower also pays 10 percent of discre-
tionary income but forgiveness arrives after 20 or 25
years.17 No particular career or profession, or even
any job at all, is required under IBR, however — it
is available to everyone.
The career choices and payment periods are not
the only differences between PSLF and IBR. Under
Treasury’s current interpretation, section 108(f) pro-
vides an exclusion of COSD income for student loan
forgiveness only under PSLF, not under IBR. In a
September 19, 2008, letter to Rep. Sander M. Levin,
Eric Solomon, then-assistant secretary for tax policy,
confirmed this interpretation.18 Thus, IBR borrow-
ers potentially face the tax bomb of taxable COSD
income just when their outstanding debt is for-
given.
But the tax bomb can also hit other forms of
discharge, such as disability and defense to repay-
ment. Like IBR, those discharges do not require
work in a specific profession for a specific period,
and thus don’t fit the language of section 108(f).19
Oddly, the HEA provides a specific exclusion for
COSD income from closed school discharge,20 a fact
that Treasury missed in its 2008 letter, but later
corrected in Rev. Proc. 2015-57 (discussed below)21
after receiving a letter from Sens. Warren, Richard J.
Durbin, D-Ill., and Sherrod Brown, D-Ohio, and
Rep. Maxine Waters, D-Calif.22 The fact that the
exclusion was in the HEA, not the tax code, and that
Treasury wasn’t aware of it until it was brought to
their attention underscores the patchwork nature of
the relevant law.
That bill was referred to the Ways and Means Committee, and
no further action has been taken.
8See College Board, ‘‘Total Federal and Nonfederal Loans
Over Time,’’ Trends in Student Aid 2015, at 16, Figure 5, available
at https://trends.collegeboard.org/student-aid.
9See ‘‘Federal Family Education Loan Program,’’ 34 CFR part
682.
10See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,
P.L. 111-152, sections 2201-2213, 124 Stat. 1029, 1074-1081 (2010).
1120 U.S.C. sections 1087 (FFEL loans) and 1087e(a)(1) (incor-
porating FFEL terms for direct loans).
12See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. section 1087e(h) (direct loans).
13See supra note 4.
14See ‘‘Income-Driven Plans,’’ available at http://www.stu
dentaid.gov/idr.
15See John R. Brooks, ‘‘Student Loans as Taxes,’’ Tax Notes,
Apr. 25, 2016, p. 513.
16See ‘‘Public Service Loan Forgiveness,’’ 34 CFR section
685.219.
17See 34 CFR sections 685.209 and 685.221.
18Letter from Eric Solomon, assistant secretary for Tax Policy,
to Rep. Levin (Sept. 19, 2008) (on file with author), available at
https://www.edvisors.com/media/files/discharge-forms/
20080919-treasury-forgiveness-levin.pdf.
19See id.
2020 U.S.C. sections 1087ee(a)(5) (PSLF loans), 1087(c)(4)
(incorporating section 1087ee(a)(5) for FFEL loans), and
1087e(a)(1) (incorporating FFEL terms for Direct Loans).
212015-51 IRB 863. See infra note 24.
22Letter from Warren et al. to Jack Lew, Treasury secretary
(Aug. 11, 2015).
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B. Recent Moves on Loan Cancellation
In 2015 the Education Department forced the
closure of Corinthian Colleges, a chain of poorly
performing for-profit colleges that was allegedly
abusing the federal student loan program.23 The
Education Department announced that it was al-
lowing discharge of outstanding student loans for
these schools under either the closed school or
defense to repayment discharge provisions of the
HEA, with loose standards for applying those pro-
visions.24 For example, closed school discharge is
generally for students attending the school when it
closed or who withdrew within 120 days of the
closing, but the Education Department extended
that window back nearly a year for the Corinthian
borrowers. The Education Department used simi-
larly broad standards for determining if a student
had a defense to repayment because of possible
fraud by Corinthian. (It appears that the Education
Department has not applied these same standards
to other discharges, however.)
As noted above, in 2008 Treasury stated as a
general matter that closed school and defense to
repayment discharges under the HEA still create
taxable COD income. However, in the Corinthian
case, after prompting from Warren and others,25
Treasury issued Rev. Proc. 2015-57, which stated
that the IRS would not assert that any of the
Corinthian borrowers affected had taxable income.
In the case of closed school discharge, Treasury
cited the HEA provisions that state such discharge
does not create taxable income, thus reversing the
position in the 2008 letter to Levin. In the case of
defense to repayment discharge, Treasury instead
relied on a combination of the insolvency exclusion
in section 108(a)(1)(B) and a general principle that a
‘‘legal infirmity’’ like fraud in the underlying trans-
action could affect the amount of debt deemed
discharged. (The revenue procedure is vague on
that point, but presumably Treasury had in mind
something like the ‘‘contested liability’’ doctrine at
issue in Zarin v. Commissioner.26)
Rev. Proc. 2015-57 stated that the Corinthian
borrowers claiming a defense to repayment were
likely victims of fraudulent misrepresentations, in-
solvent at the time of the discharge, or both but that
determining that case by case would require a ‘‘fact
intensive analysis of the particular borrower’s situ-
ation.’’ It concluded that ‘‘such an analysis would
impose a compliance burden on taxpayers, as well
as an administrative burden on the IRS, that is
excessive in relation to the amount of taxable in-
come that would result. Accordingly, the IRS will
not assert that a taxpayer within the scope of this
revenue procedure recognizes gross income as a
result of the Defense to Repayment discharge pro-
cess.’’
Earlier this year, the Education Department also
made a push to publicize the availability of disabil-
ity discharge, including sending letters to 387,000
borrowers that it believes are eligible, based on
disability information from the Social Security Ad-
ministration.27 On its website for handling appli-
cants for disability discharge, the Education
Department states that ‘‘the amount of the dis-
charged debt will be considered income for federal
tax purposes and possibly for state tax purposes’’
and that it will send Forms 1099-C to those whose
debts are discharged.28 Considering that those bor-
rowers were identified as unable to work because of
disability, they are even more likely to qualify for
the insolvency exclusion in section 108(a)(1)(B) than
the Corinthian borrowers, but Treasury has not yet
ruled.
Finally, in June the Education Department pro-
posed new regulations to change the process for
defense to repayment discharge, among other
changes.29 It would expand the definition of a
‘‘misrepresentation’’ by the school to include state-
ments that would ‘‘mislead under the circum-
stances,’’ rather than just ‘‘deceive,’’ and ‘‘any
statement that omits information in a way as to
make the statement false, erroneous, or mislead-
ing.’’30 The proposed regulations also clarify the
process for demonstrating a defense to repayment,
which would include contract-based claims for the
failure to provide education or other services.31 The
proposed regulations do not address the tax treat-
ment of COSD income, noting that the Education
Department does not have that authority.32
C. Congress Should Act
To summarize the patchwork tax treatment of
student debt forgiveness: Borrowers will not have
taxable COSD income for closed school discharge,
but will have taxable COSD income for death and
23See supra note 2.
24See id.; Department of Education, ‘‘Federal Student Aid,
Information About Debt Relief for Corinthian College Stu-
dents,’’ available at http://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/ann
ouncements/corinthian.
25See Warren et al., supra note 22.
26Zarin v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990).
27See supra note 3.
28Department of Education, ‘‘Total and Permanent Disability
(TPD) Discharge,’’ available at http://www.disabilitydischa
rge.com.
29See notice of proposed rulemaking, supra note 1.
30Id. at 39409-39410 (to be codified at 34 CFR section 668.71).
31Id. at 39417-39418 (to be codified at 34 CFR section 685.222).
32Id. at 39352.
COMMENTARY / POLICY PERSPECTIVE
TAX NOTES, August 1, 2016 753
(C) Tax Analysts 2016. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
disability, false certification, and defense to repay-
ment discharge. Borrowers will not have taxable
COSD income for student debt forgiveness under
PSLF (or Teacher Loan Forgiveness and similar
public service oriented programs), but will have
taxable COSD income for IBR, PAYE, and REPAYE
forgiveness. There is clearly no underlying logic for
this varied treatment.
The right policy here is to exclude all COSD
income. In a typical case of COD, creating taxable
income in the amount of the cancellation makes
sense. The canonical case here is Kirby Lumber,33 in
which a business bought back its bonds for below
face value, creating a net benefit to itself. Taxing
that benefit provided by a third party is appropri-
ate. But in the student loan case, extracting a
portion of the debt from borrowers who had just
had their debt forgiven violates the policies under-
lying student debt forgiveness in the first place.
Unlike the Kirby Lumber situation, the lender and
the tax collector are the same party, so taxing
forgiveness is tantamount to allowing only partial
rather than full forgiveness — the government
collects a portion of the debt regardless. To tack
such balloon payments onto the discharge pro-
grams undermines their purposes.
The best way to fix that anomaly is for Congress
to pass the Student Loan Tax Relief Act or similar
legislation to amend section 108. And Congress
should do this sooner rather than later. Current
discharges are focused on disabled borrowers or
borrowers who are likely insolvent, whereas IBR
discharges may not come until around 2028, when
the first borrowers to use IBR and PAYE have their
loans forgiven.34 Amending the code now will have
a relatively low revenue score because the big
forgivenesses under IBR will be outside the budget
window, and the current discharges for disability
and defense to repayment are unlikely to lose much
revenue. Passing a law now that has a revenue
effect outside the budget window is a somewhat
cynical strategy, but hardly rare. Congress still has a
few more years to have this free lunch, but the clock
is ticking.
D. If Congress Doesn’t Act, Treasury Should
Assuming the anti-Trump wave doesn’t leave the
Democrats controlling both houses of Congress,
Treasury may have to consider acting unilaterally to
exclude COSD income created by IBR, PAYE, and
REPAYE. While its legislative authority is weaker
than Treasury might prefer, there is nonetheless
sufficient authority for it to act.
1. Scholarship exclusion. ‘‘Qualified scholarships’’
are excluded from income by section 117, and
proposed regulations under section 117 state that
scholarships include ‘‘a reduction in the amount
owed by the recipient to an educational organization
for tuition, room and board, or any other fee’’
[emphasis added].35 Therefore, the scholarship con-
cept clearly captures loan forgiveness. It would be
only a small additional step for Treasury to rule or
to issue additional regulations that discharges of
federal student loans would also be ‘‘scholarships.’’
I explore some of the wrinkles of this below, but
some history first may be helpful.
Congress first added section 108(f) in 1984 to deal
with the fact that the section 117 exclusion for
scholarships did not apply to early versions of
PSLF.36 Early versions of PSLF were often state-
based programs that forgave student loans if gradu-
ates worked in specific fields or geographic areas.
For example, one state gave medical students a
$10,000 advance to pay for medical school tuition,
but it would forgive repayment if the graduates
worked in a rural area of the state. In Rev. Rul.
73-256,37 the IRS ruled that section 117 did not apply
to this program because there was a quid pro quo,
namely that the graduates work in a particular
geographic region. It cited the Supreme Court case
of Bingler v. Johnson,38 which held that section 117
applied to ‘‘no-strings educational grants, with no
requirement of any substantial quid pro quo from
the recipients.’’39 Requiring specific actions is akin
to paying an employee, not making a scholarship
grant, the IRS ruled.
Congress remedied this problem with specific
provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 197640 and the
Revenue Act of 1978,41 but the exclusions applied
only to loans made before January 1, 1983.42 Con-
gress then added section 108(f) in the Deficit Reduc-
tion Act of 1984 to make the exclusion permanent.43
But because section 108(f) was written to apply to
PSLF-type programs that require specific types of
33United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
34The bulk of the discharges won’t begin until around 2033
because loans disbursed between 2007 and 2011 only qualify for
PAYE if the borrower also receives a loan disbursement after
October 1, 2011. See 34 CFR section 685.209(a)(iii). In contrast, all
loans made after October 1, 2011, qualify.
35Prop. reg. section 1.117-6(c)(3)(i).
36See Joint Committee on Taxation, ‘‘General Explanation of
the Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,’’
JCS-41-84, at 1199-1201 (Dec. 1984).
371973-1 C.B. 56.
38Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
39Id. at 750.
40P.L. 94-455, section 2117, 90 Stat. 1520, 1911-1912.
41P.L. 95-600, section 162, 92 Stat. 2763, 2810.
42Id. The 1976 act applied only to loans made before 1979, but
the 1978 act extended that to loans made before 1983.
43P.L. 98-369, section 1076(a), 98 Stat. 494, 1053.
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employment, it doesn’t apply on its face to IBR or
other kinds of discharge, which have no such
requirement.
But going back to the original 1973 revenue
ruling, the reason section 117 couldn’t apply in the
first place is because of the quid pro quo for
PSLF-type forgiveness. But there is no such quid
pro quo for IBR, disability, or other forms of for-
giveness; qualification is based solely on income or
other factors, with no particular career, employer, or
geography required. Thus, the section 117 exclusion
should be available.
Forgiving a student loan may not fit neatly into a
conventional idea of scholarship, but the underly-
ing economics are pretty close to a need-based
scholarship. A student loan is, after all, just a
deferred payment of tuition and related expenses,
so forgiving some of that loan based on need is
similar to lowering tuition based on need — but
with the determination of need based on post-
graduate characteristics, rather than pre-
matriculation characteristics. (I argue in an article in
the Georgetown Law Journal that this is actually a
more equitable way to determine need.44)
The proposed regulation cited above is consistent
with this view that loan forgiveness can be a ‘‘schol-
arship,’’ but unfortunately the regulation probably
does not apply by its terms to federal student loans.
It refers to loans by an ‘‘educational organization,’’
as defined in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii),45 and thus does
not include the Education Department or related
loan servicers. But the principle is the same, and a
new regulation could expand that definition to in-
clude amounts owned to the Education Department.
A bigger challenge under section 117 is that the
exclusion is only for ‘‘qualified scholarships,’’ not
all scholarships.46 Qualified scholarships are those
that go toward ‘‘qualified tuition and related ex-
penses,’’ and expenses such as room and board,
travel, and supplies are not related expenses unless
they are ‘‘required for either enrollment or atten-
dance of a student at an educational organization’’47
or in a ‘‘course of instruction at such an education
organization’’ [emphasis added]. That could ex-
clude most room, board, and other living expenses.
That may not be a big problem for undergraduate
direct loans, if the schools and the Education De-
partment are smart about how they allocate the
loans and any grants,48 but it could be a hurdle for
graduate students borrowing the full cost of atten-
dance. While my preference is for a full exclusion, a
partial exclusion may satisfy some IBR critics who
view forgiveness for graduates of professional
schools as too generous.49 That said, the IRS could
use its discretion to say it’s not worth the effort of
figuring out how much of each individual loan
went to tuition and related expenses, much as it did
in applying the insolvency and fraud exclusions to
all Corinthian borrowers in Rev. Proc. 2015-57.
Further, it could issue new regulations under sec-
tion 117 expanding the definition of ‘‘related ex-
penses.’’
2. Insolvency exclusion. Even if section 108(f) does
not apply, section 108(a)(1)(B) could — COD in-
come is excluded if the taxpayer is insolvent when
the debt is canceled. That was one reason that
Treasury excluded the COSD income in the Corin-
thian case.
Insolvency is defined as the excess of liabilities
over the fair market value of assets.50 The determi-
nation is made immediately before the cancellation,
and any exclusion is not greater than the amount of
the insolvency at that time.51 The upshot is that, to
have a full exclusion for the COSD income, the
borrower must be insolvent by at least the amount
of the forgiven debt. If a borrower has $50,000 in
student debt forgiven, and immediately before the
forgiveness the excess of his liabilities, including
that debt, over assets is only $1,000, then there
would still be taxable COSD income of $49,000.
Just as in the Corinthian case, those seeking
discharge for total and permanent disability are
likely to be sufficiently insolvent, as are those
seeking closed school or defense to repayment
discharge. After all, their requests for discharge are
driven largely by financial distress. For IBR borrow-
ers, however, that degree of insolvency may be
unlikely given that the forgiveness is at least 20
years after leaving school, especially if the borrow-
ers have purchased homes or set up retirement
accounts. Indeed, lowering the loan payments to 10
percent of discretionary income is partly to allow
borrowers to have more room in their budgets for
those types of expenses and savings.
44See Brooks, ‘‘Income-Driven Repayment and the Public
Financing of Higher Education,’’ 104 Geo. L.J. 229, 268-272
(2016).
45Prop. reg. section 1.117-6(c)(5).
46Section 117(a).
47Section 117(b)(1); see prop. reg. section 1.117-6(c)(2).
48Direct Loans to undergraduates are limited to between
$5,500 and $7,500 per year for dependent students, with an
overall cap of $31,000.
49See, e.g., Jason Delisle and Alex Holt, ‘‘Safety Net or
Windfall?: Examining Changes to Income-Based Repayment for
Federal Student Loans,’’ New American Foundation, at 14 (Oct.
2012).
50Section 108(d)(3).
51Section 108(a)(3).
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Treasury could remedy this situation with regu-
lations defining the meaning of ‘‘insolvency’’ for
purposes of student debt. For example, Treasury
could exclude a personal residence, tax-preferred
retirement accounts, and assets exempt from credi-
tors under state law in determining the amount of
insolvency. While the statutory language seems
clear about the meaning of ‘‘liabilities,’’ cases before
the enactment of section 108(a)(1)(B) excluded as-
sets exempt under state law,52 and the legislative
history under section 108(a)(1)(B) is silent on
whether the provision was intended to overrule
those prior cases. Further, there is some indication
that Congress’s intent with section 108(a)(1)(A) and
(B) was to be consistent with bankruptcy policy
regarding a ‘‘fresh start.’’53 The bankruptcy code’s
definition of insolvency excludes assets like tax-
preferred retirement accounts, property held as a
joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety, and assets
exempt under applicable state law.54 The same
policy should apply here.
Exclusions under section 108(a)(1)(B) are applied
to reduce the taxpayers’ tax attributes, though most
borrowers seeking student loan forgiveness will not
possess many of these attributes. They may be
required to reduce their bases in any property
under section 108(b), but that reduction is limited
by section 1017(b)(2). At any rate, some partial
recapture in the future from borrowers with appre-
ciated assets may be appropriate.
3. Contingent liability. For IBR in particular, Trea-
sury could simply say that the Education Depart-
ment was never truly owed the nominal amount of
the debt in the first place. Because any student loan
borrower can now use IBR, and this is reflected in
the terms of the underlying note, the borrower
never had a legal duty to pay more than 10 percent
of her discretionary income for 20 to 25 years. The
loan is in effect a contingent liability, and the
forgiveness simply reflects that the contingent con-
ditions did not occur. The borrower has paid no
more, and the lender has received no more, than
was required.55 The Education Department has es-
sentially labeled as ‘‘forgiveness’’ what is simply
the end of the payment period for this contingent
obligation.
To see this another way, consider the REPAYE
rules, which require a borrower to pay 10 percent of
her discretionary income, no matter what her in-
come is, until a notional principal and interest
amount are paid off or after 20 years, whichever is
sooner. If all student loans started as REPAYE loans
by default and were written in that way, would
there be COD income as a formal matter? Or would
we just say that after 20 years a borrower had met
his obligations under the debt instrument?
If this seems like an odd way to think about a
loan, that’s true. Student loans in income-driven
repayment are very different from traditional loans
— they’re more akin to income share agreements or
even tax obligations. Trying to impose a Kirby
Lumber-style idea of COD income is like saying
there’s COD income for a corporation that paid less
in preferred dividends because it was not as prof-
itable as expected or for an individual who paid less
in taxes because his income was lower than ex-
pected. As I’ve written here56 and elsewhere,57 we
need to find a new way to think about student loans
in income-driven repayment — treating them as
typical loans no longer works.
The contingent debt argument could be applied
to disability, closed school, and defense to repay-
ment discharges as well. For closed school and
defense to repayment, the argument would be that
the debt was contingent on the school performing at
some minimum standard. For disability discharge,
the debt was contingent on a person being suffi-
ciently able to generate enough income to service
the loan. The letter from Warren et al. expands on
those points in detail.58
4. Significant debt modification. Finally, as an
alternative to the contingent liability theory, for IBR
there is an argument that any COD income should
be calculated when the borrower goes into IBR,
rather than when the remaining debt is forgiven.59
Thus, even if the original debt was equal to the face
amount, the switch from standard repayment to
income-driven repayment is a ‘‘significant debt
modification,’’ and therefore a taxable exchange of
one debt instrument for another.60 Under section
52See, e.g., Cole v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 1110 (1940); Marcus
Estate v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-9. But see Carlson v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. 87, 101 (2001) (holding that the section
108(d)(3) definition precludes the application of Cole and other
earlier cases).
53S. Rep. No. 96-1035, at 10 (1980) (‘‘The rules of the bill
concerning income tax treatment of debt discharge in bank-
ruptcy are intended to accommodate bankruptcy policy and tax
policy. . . . A debtor coming out of bankruptcy (or an insolvent
debtor outside bankruptcy) is not burdened with an immediate tax
liability’’ [emphasis added].).
5411 U.S.C. sections 101(32)(A) and 522.
55See, e.g., Corporacion de Ventas Etc. v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d
141, 143-144 (2d Cir. 1942) (no COD income for cancellation of
payments that were contingent on future profits). For more on
this theory, see Warren et al., supra note 22.
56Brooks, supra note 15.
57Brooks, supra note 44, at 258-263.
58See Warren et al., supra note 22.
59This argument does not apply as easily to disability, closed
school, and defense to repayment discharges.
60See reg. section 1.1001-3(b). It’s not certain that entering IBR
would be significant modification, however. The change in the
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108(e)(10), any COD income should be calculated at
the time of that exchange based on the difference in
value between the two debt instruments. But both
the new and the old instruments would be hard to
value at that time — the new IBR instrument
because it is contingent on future income and the
old standard repayment instrument because (a) the
borrower had enough financial hardship to need
IBR, and (b) IBR was always available. With that
degree of uncertainty it would be impossible to
determine how much COD income there is, if any.61
Further, because most borrowers will enter IBR in a
period of financial hardship, the section 108(a)(1)(B)
insolvency exception is much more likely to apply
at that time than 20 years in the future. Thus, the
IRS could apply the same reasoning as in Rev. Proc.
2015-57 to ignore the transaction.
E. Conclusion
In a recent story on the struggles of some law
students and law schools, The New York Times
described a student with substantial amounts of
student debt, but relatively low potential income.62
In past years, that alone would have described a
problem of financial hardship. But since IBR is now
available, the description of the problem changed. It
was not the debt itself, which the article acknowl-
edged could eventually be forgiven. Rather, the
problem was the large potential tax bill due upon
forgiveness.63
Although there is still a natural reaction when
one sees large nominal debt amounts, especially for
graduate school, the problem in an IBR era is
fundamentally different than in earlier eras. The
problem, as presented in the New York Times article,
is no longer ‘‘How can someone pay back $200,000
over 10 years?’’ It is ‘‘How can someone afford the
lump sum $70,000 tax bill that comes with loan
forgiveness?’’ In lifetime terms, one would rather
pay $70,000 than $200,000, but it is still a substantial
hardship, especially because it falls all in one year. It
could turn loan forgiveness from a long-term bless-
ing into a short-term curse.
The problem is easy to fix, however. Congress
should pass the Student Loan Tax Relief Act — a
small bill, with little to no revenue cost within the
budget window. And likely no significant overall
revenue cost either, if one believes, as I do, that it’s
unlikely for the government ever to collect on these
tax bills.
But Congress is Congress, and if it continues to
fail to act, Treasury should step in to provide an
exclusion. Treasury has the authority to act under
section 117, section 108, and long-standing regula-
tory and common law on contingent liabilities and
debt modifications. A combination of some minor
regulatory changes and IRS discretion should be
sufficient to exclude most or all income from COSD,
especially for those most in need of relief.
terms is clearly economically significant, but under the section
1001 regulations, some alterations occurring by operation of the
terms of the debt instrument don’t count as ‘‘modifications’’ (the
IBR options are included in the Education Department’s Master
Promissory Note). See reg. section 1.1001-3(c)(1)(ii). For entering
IBR to count as a modification, it would have to be considered
exercising an option that’s not unilateral, that is, one that was
subject to the other party’s approval. See reg. section 1.1001-
3(c)(2)(iii) and -3(c)(3). As a formal matter, the Education
Department, the lender, must approve the borrower’s entry into
IBR, and it has the sole discretion to make the income determi-
nation that leads to the lower payments. It’s not clear whether
this is the sort of approval intended by the regulation — the
examples and existing rulings are not on point. But as with the
other avenues to excluding COSD income, if the hurdles are
regulatory, they are within Treasury’s power to amend them —
the statute itself does not present a problem.
61See Ventas, 130 F.2d at 143 (‘‘Whether the taxpayer made a
profit or loss in buying up debentures at 45 percent discount
from face value is as yet pure speculation.’’).
62See Noam Scheiber, ‘‘An Expensive Law Degree, and No
Place to Use It,’’ The New York Times, June 19, 2016, at BU1. The
article has been criticized, especially by Michael Simkovic. See
Simkovic, ‘‘Why the New York Times Should Correct Remain-
ing Factual Errors in Its Law School Coverage,’’ Brian Leiter’s
Law School Reports (June 24, 2016).
63Id. (‘‘The government will eventually forgive the loan — in
20 years — if he’s unable to repay it, as is likely on his
small-town lawyer’s salary. But the Internal Revenue Service
will probably treat the forgiven amount as income, leaving him
what could easily be a $70,000 tax bill on the eve of retirement,
and possibly much higher.’’).
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